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China Linked Cyber Groups Exploit Zero Day Flaw in SAP NetWeaver to Breach Global Networks

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Multiple China-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) groups have exploited a critical zero-day vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer, identified as CVE-2025-31324, according to EclecticIQ analysts. The breach has impacted critical infrastructure and enterprise networks worldwide.

Unpatched SAP Flaw Enables Deep System Compromise

The vulnerability allows for unauthenticated file uploads, granting attackers remote code execution (RCE) capabilities. This enables them to gain deep access to systems, maintain persistence, and execute commands remotely. Open directories on attacker-controlled servers revealed logs of at least 581 compromised SAP NetWeaver systems.

Global Campaign and Attack Methods

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The campaign has been linked to Chinese state-affiliated groups UNC5221, UNC5174, and CL-STA-0048, with threat intelligence support from Mandiant and Palo Alto Networks. Attackers performed widespread internet scans using tools like Nuclei to identify vulnerable SAP endpoints.

Their command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, particularly the IP address 15.204.56[.]106, stored logs and exploit results, showcasing the scale of the operation.

Webshell Deployment for Persistence and Command Execution

Following exploitation, the attackers deployed customized webshells to maintain access:

  • coreasp.js – A variant of the Behinder webshell encrypted with AES/ECB, allowing in-memory execution without disk traces.
  • forwardsap.jsp – A lightweight, unauthenticated shell enabling quick command execution.

These webshells were uploaded through the vulnerable /developmentserver/metadatauploader API endpoint, offering persistent access while evading detection.

Targeted Sectors Include Energy, Healthcare, and Government

The attackers focused on industries crucial to national security and public welfare, including:

  • UK natural gas and water utilities
  • US medical device manufacturers and oil exploration companies
  • Saudi government ministries

The strategic targeting of SAP NetWeaver, often linked to Industrial Control Systems (ICS), raises significant risks of espionage and disruption.

Detailed Threat Group Activities

  • CL-STA-0048: Utilized TCP reverse shells and DNS beaconing for remote control, communicating with the domain sentinelones[.]com.
  • UNC5221: Deployed KrustyLoader malware, downloaded from Amazon S3, to install Sliver backdoors for stealthy persistence.
  • UNC5174: Delivered SNOWLIGHT downloader to initiate VShell RAT, providing in-memory control through SAP endpoints.

These groups used advanced reconnaissance, network mapping, and cloud exploitation, leveraging vulnerabilities in VMware ESXi hypervisors for lateral movement.

Security Recommendations and Mitigation

Immediate application of SAP Security Note #3594142 is advised. For systems where patching is not possible, SAP suggests removing vulnerable components and restricting API exposure.

Organizations should conduct:

  • Threat hunting for unauthorized webshells and suspicious file uploads.
  • Network monitoring for outbound connections to identified C2 infrastructure.
  • Log analysis of web access and process activity for anomalies.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Security teams are urged to cross-check their environments against known IOCs linked to the campaign to prevent further exploitation

Threat Actor/ClusterIOC TypeValue/Details
Unattributed China Nexus (scanning C2)IP15.204.56[.]106
SHA2564c9e60cc73e87da4cadc51523690d67549de4902e880974bfacf7f1a8dc40d7d
SHA25663aa0c6890ec5c16b872fb6d070556447cd707dfba185d32a2c10c008dbdbcdd
CL-STA-0048 (reverse shell/DNS beaconing)IP/Domain43.247.135[.]53 (sentinelones[.]com, TCP 10443)
Domainaaa.ki6zmfw3ps8q14rfbfczfq5qkhq8e12q.oastify.com
IPs54.77.139[.]23, 3.248.33[.]252
UNC5221 (KrustyLoader malware)S3 domainsapplr-malbbal.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws[.]com
S3 domainsabode-dashboard-media.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws[.]com
S3 domainsbrandnav-cms-storage.s3.amazonaws[.]com
SHA256f92d0cf4d577c68aa615797d1704f40b14810d98b48834b241dd5c9963e113ec
SHA2563f14dc65cc9e35989857dc1ec4bb1179ab05457f2238e917b698edb4c57ae7ce
UNC5174 (SNOWLIGHT/VShell/GOREVERSE)IP103.30.76[.]206 (TCP 443)
SHA25600920e109f16fe61092e70fca68a5219ade6d42b427e895202f628b467a3d22e
SHA2562dcbb4138f836bb5d7bc7d8101d3004848c541df6af997246d4b2a252f29d51a
Aliyun objectocr-freespace.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/2025/config.sh
General (victim SAP systems)IPs (examples)45.155.222[.]14, 159.65.34[.]242, 138.68.61[.]82, 192.243.115[.]175
Webshell fileshelper.jsp, forwardsap.jsp, coreasp.js, .webhelper.jsp, 404_error.jsp
Pradeep Sharma
Pradeep Sharmahttps://pradeepsharma.widelamp.com
A cybersecurity and physics expert, skilled in quantum computing, Cybersecurity and network security, dedicated to advancing digital and scientific innovation.
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